



honorably-discharged US Army officer and veteran of US military operations in the Korean Demilitarized Zone.

2. My affidavit documents the CIA's record of failing to disclose and release its POW/MIA information and identifies POW/MIA records the Agency apparently possesses but has not produced in this case. My research indicates the CIA has failed to produce POW/MIA documents falling into four categories:

**CIA records specifically mentioned in other production by title, content and/or date but apparently not produced;**

**CIA records specifically alluded to in production but, to my knowledge, not produced;**

**CIA records that, based upon other production, almost certainly exist due to known Agency processes but, to my knowledge, have not been produced;**

**CIA records that, based upon information revealed outside this production by the CIA and other sources, almost certainly exist due to known Agency processes but, to my knowledge, have not been produced.**

3. The CIA has kept important POW-related information classified in contradiction to the spirit and letter of the FOIA; pertinent Executive Orders and laws; and its own pledges of transparency. It has also denied the very existence of historically-significant information to POW/MIA family members; FOIA requestors; Congress and other executive branch organizations, only to declassify and release such information years or even decades later.

4. For example, according to production in this case, the Agency informed both the US Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs and the US Army in 1992 that it held “no information” indicating US POWs were sent to the Soviet Union during the Korean War (and, in the case of this CIA communication to the Senate, that it had no information that such shipments occurred during the Vietnam War, though the Agency later changed that position).<sup>1</sup> Yet at the very time the CIA was stating it had “no information” on shipments of US POWs from Korea to the Soviet Union, it possessed detailed classified documents on just such reported transfers, with titles such as: “Location of Certain Soviet Transit Camps for POW from Korea” (May 3, 1953); “American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR” (Dec. 31, 1953); “US Prisoners of War in USSR” (April 27, 1954), attached as Exhibit 1; and “American Prisoners-of-War Held in the USSR” (Dec. 29, 1953). These documents were only revealed and declassified years after the Agency’s denials, and it appears likely others like them remain secret to this day.

5. The withheld POW/MIA records included those of substantial historical and political significance, including one entitled: “U. S. Prisoners of War Remaining in Communist Custody After Termination of Exchange of Prisoners Under Terms of Korean Armistice Agreement” (Feb. 2, 1954), attached as Exhibit

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<sup>1</sup> [“We have reviewed our files and found no information which would indicate that American POWs from either the Korean or Vietnam wars were transferred to the Soviet Union.” CIA letter to Chairman of US Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, Jan. 21, 1992 (C00492268). “The general asked if we had any information supporting the sometimes heard allegations that American POWs were moved to the Soviet Union during the Korean War. We said we do not:” “EA/ICOG Spot Report - 4 November 1992” reporting on meeting with U.S. Army POW/MIA official (C06010860).]

2. This document reveals the US Air Force Chief of Staff secretly asked the CIA to conduct "clandestine and covert" operations to rescue "an unknown but apparently substantial number of U.S. military personnel captured in the course of the Korean War (who) are still being held prisoners by the Communist Forces" in various locations, possibly including the "Soviet orbit." This document was revealed on the CIA Freedom of Information Act Electronic Reading Room (the "FOIA Web site" or "site"), not via production for this case. According to meta-data on the CIA site, this document from 1954 was not posted for public review until 2012, after being "approved for release" in 2004. This was more than a decade after the Agency told the Senate it possessed "no information" on this topic and after the CIA had failed to release this document to a number of FOIA requestors seeking such records.

6. The CIA apparently continues to withhold POW/MIA documents, including some more than 60-years-old. The CIA record related to the Air Force's POW rescue request, discussed in Paragraph 5 above, references a similar plea from the US Army for help in recovering its Korean War prisoners. To the best of my knowledge, CIA records related to that 1953 Army request have not yet been released. At the National Archives, other documents dating back to 1953 are being refused to POW/MIA family members and researchers based on documented and suspected CIA classification authority.<sup>2</sup> I have seen no

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<sup>2</sup> Examples from the National Archives that include specific reference to CIA classification authority include "Withdrawal Sheets" (archival placeholders indicating the removal of still-classified records) for "(USAF) Master SIRAB File Secret OCT-DEC 1953, Authority: CIA" (among

indication in the CIA production pursuant to this action that the Agency has reviewed or processed National Archives documents from these and certain later document sets.

7. The Agency also continues to violate the spirit and, I believe, letter of the FOIA. Take the case of Yuri Rastvorov, a Soviet defector and source for the now declassified, and widely reported, White House document entitled "Subject: Interview with Rastvorov (former MVD) concerning U.S. prisoners of war in the USSR" (Jan. 31, 1955) attached as Exhibit 3, which was declassified pursuant to my request after years of review. Following the 2004 death of Rastvorov (reported in the *Washington Post* and elsewhere), I submitted a FOIA request to the CIA for files concerning his POW/MIA information. The Agency has refused even to admit the existence of such records, generated more than 60 years ago, stating: "(I)n accordance with section 3.6(a) of Executive Order 13526, the CIA can neither confirm nor deny the existence or nonexistence of records responsive to your request. The fact of the existence or nonexistence of requested records is currently and properly classified..." (Nov. 16, 2012). This response was issued despite the federal government's declassification of Rastvorov's White House POW report; comments in the media by former CIA officers concerning his POW information; and widely-publicized congressional

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others in this series). I believe CIA information is likely included in the still-classified files of CCRAK, a joint U.S. Army/CIA organization known to have collected POW/MIA information during and after the Korean War. "Withdrawal Sheets" for CCRAK include "350.05 E.E.I. Escape and Evasion," a document from Aug. 11, 1955, among others.

testimony and media interviews on other topics by Rastvorov after his defection, which were almost certainly approved and managed by the CIA. To my knowledge, these POW/MIA records involving Rastvorov -- and later files from certain other Soviet defectors related to Vietnam POW/MIAs, see below -- have not been produced pursuant to this litigation.

8. Vietnam War POW/MIA records are also apparently being withheld by the CIA. These documents fall into several categories:

**CIA records specifically mentioned in other production by title, content and/or date but apparently not produced:**

9. The missing "initial reviews" mentioned in, and other records related to, a produced document entitled "The [REDACTED] Reports" and provided by CIA to various Senators on or about May 26, 1993. This produced document (C006002491) mentions the continued "political sensitivity" of reports provided years before by the [REDACTED] source, because they "tend to corroborate" the (then) recently revealed Soviet "1205 Document" attached as Exhibit 4. This redacted source is almost certainly defector Dr. Dang Tan, whose defection was made public in a press conference arranged by the CIA in 1971. Other records that I believe exist concerning this defector's knowledge of US POW/MIAs and the CIA's analysis of that knowledge -- including, I believe, at least one CIA memo to senior White House officials -- should be produced.

10. The CIA Memorandum for Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, "Subject: Indication that the Communists Are Holding Previously Unlisted U.S. POWs as a Future Bargaining Tool, March 20, 1973." This document (C00313431) is referenced in a

record released at least twice under production, but I have not found the document itself in the production or in the CIA's FOIA Web site.

11. The "Memorandum for National Security Advisor Anthony Lake from National Intelligence Officer for East Asia (NIC/CIA), indicating it was 'possible' Hanoi held back US POWs in 1973, and was angry reparations from the U.S. had not been forthcoming," dated December 13, 1993. The existence of this document and its description are revealed in other production. I believe this record may be the same document described elsewhere as: "Memorandum to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Anthony Lake from National Intelligence Officer for East Asia Robert Suettinger, dated December 13, 1993. (S)."

12. The "Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Subject: Re-evaluation of PW/MIA Information, dated August 13, 1976" (C00313431).

13. The record: "Central Intelligence Agency, Director of Intelligence Memorandum, Hanoi and US Prisoners of War June 28, 1971" (C00313431).

14. "CIA 240202Z Jul 82, Subject: Organization and Inmates of Tan Lap Prison, Vinh Phu Province (North Vietnam)" (C00313431).

15. "Memorandum for the Record, 22 December, 1970, Subject: Meeting of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam, see para 4, "Possible High-Level DRV Meeting in Hanoi" (C00313431).

16. "DO Spot Report date 6 January 1981."

17. "Memorandum for the Record," March 5, 1999 (C0600273):

“September 1996 and August 1998 Top Secret memorandum.”

**CIA records specifically alluded to in production but, to my knowledge, not produced**

18. These include CIA documents concerning U.S. POWs reported in North Korea prior to 1975 and after 1982, including but not limited to those allegedly captured during the Vietnam War and shipped to Hanoi's allies in North Korea. Production has included a March 9, 1988 document (Hall Exhibit 44) entitled “Alleged Sightings of Americans POWs in North Korea from 1975 to 1982” and a produced CIA memo confirms its search was limited to 1975-82. Based on reported sightings released by the DoD and other U.S. agencies, including some still listed as classified, I believe there is a strong possibility CIA has reports from before 1975 and after 1982 concerning alleged American POWs in North Korea. They should be produced.

**CIA records that , based upon other production, almost certainly exist due to known Agency processes but, to my knowledge, have not been produced**

19. Records almost certainly remain to be produced in relation to the 2-page letter, attached as Exhibit 5, from the DCI to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Aug. 28, 1985, that concerns “the (Central Intelligence) Agency’s capability to [REDACTED] should other credible intelligence sources indicate the possible presence of U.S. POWs” (C00479076). The letter appears to discuss the CIA’s ability to conduct secret operations in Southeast Asia involving reported POWs. In my experience, a detailed letter such as this, from the head



of the CIA to the head of the DIA, would have been written based on staff reports and analysis, which have to my knowledge not been produced.

20. POW-related information from CIA debriefings of various Soviet defectors, including MIG-pilot defector Alexander Zuyev, who was moved to the United States and whose POW/MIA knowledge is referenced in 2016 production and limited open-source references. The produced document C06002273 from 1999 also refers to additional information from Soviet sources that has not been produced.

21. CIA analysis of the statement by Dmitri Volkogonov, Russian head of the U.S. Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, whose widely-publicized comments on a "KGB-assigned mission and plan to 'transfer knowledgeable Americans (POWs in Vietnam) to the USSR'" is also referenced in 2016 production.

**CIA records that, based upon information revealed outside this production by the CIA and/or other sources, almost certainly exist due to known Agency processes but, to my knowledge, have not been produced**

22. CIA records produced pursuant to a memo from the Director of the CIA (DCI) to the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) entitled "Subject: Prisoners of War" and reading: "I'd like a rundown of the present state of our knowledge, leads, and activities with respect to POWs," attached as Exhibit 6. I retrieved this April 29, 1985 memo from the CIA FOIA Web site; it appears related to another document on the site entitled "LETTER - SOLARZ TO CASEY - REQUEST FOR INFO ON POW - WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE DATED 24 APRIL 1985--INTERIM

RESPONSE" (CIA-RDP87M01152R000500640048-0). I have not seen this document, or the "final response" that was presumably sent by the DCI, in production.

23. CIA analysis and support of the effort in 1984-5 (detailed by the US Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, declassified State Department records and other sources) to respond to an alleged Vietnamese offer to sell American POW/MIA remains and, potentially, living POWs to the United States. Assistant Secretary of State Paul Wolfowitz informed Secretary of State George Shultz of a plan to pay for remains and "possible live POWs" (also called "breathers", according, the Senate noted, to a January 1985 memo marked "super-sensitive.") NSC staffer Richard Childress, with the concurrence of the National Security Advisor, traveled to Vietnam and "intended to fund the initiative with either CIA or private funds," according to the Senate, which reported "the Committee could not conclusively determine whether individuals in the government of North Vietnam discussed the possibility of there being live POWs in 1984; the Select Committee does find that the sale of remains was discussed." In my experience, such a sensitive foreign policy initiative could not have occurred without CIA documentation being produced, especially as the White House was considering the use of "CIA funds" for the transaction.

24. POW/MIA records involving Le Quang Khai, a Vietnamese diplomat who defected to the US in/around 1992 and made comments concerning Hanoi's retention of US POW/MIA.

25. Supporting documents related to various documents released on the CIA Web site, but apparently not in production. These include files used to prepare the 23-page, Top Secret "US-Vietnamese Talks on POWs/MIAs During the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations Prepared for Richard Childress, National Security Council," Sep. 23, 1985 (released on the CIA FOIA Web site, Document Number (FOIA) / ESDN (CREST): 0005359871. I also believe relevant documents remain unproduced that relate to various entries in the President's Daily Brief (PDB) record series, released in part on the CIA FOIA site this year. This includes but is not limited to supporting documentation for statements in the Feb. 28, 1973 PDB that: "Hanoi's announcement that no US prisoners will be released until 'serious problems' in the implementation of the Vietnam agreement are take care of appears to reflect North Vietnamese fears that return of all the prisoners will cost them their leverage." The June 4, 1974 PDB notes that "four Americans are believed to have been captured in Laos prior to the February 1973 cease-fire agreement," in addition to 314 Americans listed as MIA. This briefing for the President reports: "The Communists' failure to release any prisoners prior to the June 4 deadline supports earlier indications that they intend to use the issue to force changes in US and Thai policy toward Laos," followed by a redacted section. While production does include documents that apparently allude to the four captured Americans, I believe other records related to these PDBs, along with PDBs from the late 1970s and after that contain POW/MIA information, may not have been produced.

26. High-quality photographs, audio and video records involving POW/MIA. To my knowledge, no such records have been produced, although produced records and declassified CIA documents show they exist.

27. Documents related to dozens of still-classified "live sightings" listed by the Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA), which receives information from, and coordinates certain activities with, the CIA. Aside from "live sightings" of allegedly identified American POW/MIAs, the DPAA makes public a list of classified "generic case files," which involve alleged sightings of American POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia and North Korea whose names are not provided in or evident from the reports. In relation to Vietnam, these "generic" files appear to be part of a broader group of 55 classified "unresolved live sightings" (generic and named sightings) of Americans in Southeast Asia, most reported in "captive environments" (figure as of June 9, 2016).

"As a matter of policy, all firsthand live sightings remain classified while being analyzed or investigated. Once a sighting is resolved, the initial report and all associated documents are reviewed for declassification, and as appropriate, released," the DPAA has stated on its Web site. Based upon historical sources of "live sightings" and intelligence community and DPAA processing of such cases, along with publicly-available descriptions of these files, I believe some were likely generated by, contain information from, or have been analyzed and/or investigated by, the CIA. It appears not all such files have been produced.

In the context of this case, the FOIA and other laws involving classification of POW/MIA information, it is worth noting the “generic files” involving US POW/MIAs from Vietnam date back to Nov. 9, 1979, the “date of report” for the oldest listing, entitled “Americans in North Vietnam.” The DPAA states this document is classified because its investigation is “ongoing,” apparently meaning the US government is still “investigating” a report received in 1979. Korean War generic files dating back almost 15 years are still classified. The oldest listed Korean file was apparently received on April 22, 2002, but is still “under investigation.”

28. Open sources, including some reviewed and approved prior to publication by the CIA, indicate the existence of records not produced. For example, the CIA had a source (codename: “PASSAGE”) providing “details of Hanoi’s secret bargaining position” during the 1972 Paris Peace Talks and also launched a covert operation that year to investigate an estimated 50 or more US military and civilian POWs held in caves near the Laotian city of Sam Neua, according to former CIA official Antonio J. Mendez in his 1999 book The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA (the CIA also managed coded messages from US POWs during the war.<sup>3</sup>) This book was cleared by the CIA Publication Review Board. However, to my knowledge, all relevant information on “PASSAGE,” coded POW messages and the 1972 classified operation have not

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<sup>3</sup> The CIA Web site also includes a 2016 document entitled “Intelligence Support for Communications with US POWs in Vietnam.” I have not seen this document or the CIA sources on which it is based in production.

been produced. Another example involves an "elderly Laotian" woman with close ties to senior Laotian officials. She provided highly-sensitive intelligence to the CIA regarding US POWs held in Laos after the war, according to the 2014 book Abandoned in Place by Lynn O'Shea, which documents repeated references in the Senate investigation to this CIA source. The book also provides extensive details of CIA support for a potential POW rescue operation in Laos. I believe some CIA documents concerning the Laotian source and the rescue operation have not been produced.

DATE: September 23, 2016.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief



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Mark A. Sauter

[Redacted]

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**INFORMATION REPORT**

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT US Prisoners of War in USSR

100  
119

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

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DATE DISTR. 27 Apr 1954

NO. OF PAGES 3

NO. OF ENCLS.

SUPP. TO REPORT NO.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS REPORT IS PROHIBITED.

25X1

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

[Redacted]

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1. [Redacted] information regarding the presence of US prisoners (captured during the Korean War) on the territory of Asiatic USSR. Mostly they were in Komsomolsk (Amur River), Magadan (Bay of Nogaievo, Sea of Okhotsk), Chita, Irkutsk, Molotov, Gubakha (northwest of Molotov), Komi Permiak (Siberia), Kudymkar (northwest of Molotov), Chumbe (on the Kama River, north of Molotov. There is nothing to indicate that any of them have ever been returned.)

2. Over a year ago, the Soviet authorities established camps for prisoners (not necessarily US) taken in Korea by the Sino-North Korean forces. These camps were located at:

- Komsomolsk, on the River Amur
- Magadan, on the bay of Nogaievo, Sea of Okhotsk
- Chita
- Irkutsk

Prisoners from both the US and the various cooperating European armies were alike known as Voyennoplenkiye Amerikantsi.

SEE LAST PAGE FOR SUBJECT & AREA CODES

EXHIBIT 1

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
[Redacted]

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-2-


3. In Feb 1952, three hundred US prisoners of war were transported by rail from Chita to Molotov (in Soviet Russia, east of the Ural Mountains). At Chita, in Eastern Siberia, the prisoners were sorted out.
4. The prisoners were dressed in cotton mattress-cover cloth of the Soviet type. They wore no insignia. They traveled on a train of nine cars under strict MVD (Ministry Internal Affairs) guard. They made a long halt at the prison of the city of Gubakha and were not sent on to the prison at Molotov until 5 Apr 52. In Mar 1952 there were reports of other loads of prisoners being transported. These men spoke English among themselves. They were shipped, in groups of about fifty, every fifteen days, though it is not known how long this continued. 25X1
5. About this same time [redacted] a group of prisoners were being sent to Komi Permiak, in the northwestern part of Siberia. Their eventual destinations were Molotov, Gubakha (northwest of Molotov), Kadykhar (also northwest of Molotov), and Chernox (on the Kama River, north of Molotov).
6. Still another report, dated April 1952, reported the presence of US prisoners. These were probably US officers. At Molotov this group of prisoners of war was designated, "American staff group." They were placed in an MVD building and completely isolated from the rest of the world.
7. The camps of Gubakha, Kadykhar, and Chernox were also isolated and were under control of the MVD. The political control was in charge of a man named Edovin, of the Communist Party organization at Komi-Permiak. The three camps were under direction of a well-known Soviet officer, under the name of Kalypin, rank unknown. 25X1
8. In another camp, near the railroad station of Gubakha, called Zapretshelanki, there were 150 US prisoners. [redacted] probably mixed up an "Entrance Forbidden" sign with the name of the camp. [redacted] Russian is mixed, but certainly "zapreshchat" means "to forbid."
9. These prisoners were kept under constant surveillance by Soviet agents, who knew English perfectly. The Soviet authorities tried their best to build up a list of US prisoners who were not completely hostile to Soviet ideology or who were at least not inveterate foes of it. The US prisoners talked a good deal. In this way, the Soviet agents were able to pick out those men who might be willing to ameliorate their situation by taking an interest in courses of political instruction.
10. Every two or three days, an MVD officer called away one or two prisoners (the Soviet first choices for such instruction). These prisoners never came back to the camp.
11. Some prisoners were sent to the forced labor camps and used in the construction of a railway line. This camp was called Gaysk. These prisoners wore padded tunics of the Russian style and pantaloons. They wore a civilian headdress called "sibirki". Conditions were primitive. Sickness and death rates were high.

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
-3-

- 12. According to information covering the period Aug to Dec 1952, three hundred ~~US~~ prisoners were transported to the camps mentioned above. The total number of prisoners brought in the same direction reached six thousand.
- 13. According to information received  the following facts may be regarded as established:

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- a. Prisoners were taken by rail from the station of Poset (on the Chinese-Soviet boundary) over the line of the East Siberian Railway. They were taken to the eastern Urals.
- b. Prisoners were also taken by boat from the ports of Bukhta, Okhotsk, and Magadan. They then went by rail or truck to Vaikarem ~~[sic]~~ (on the Sea of Chukot) to Ust Maisk (on the Aldan River) and to Yakutsk (on the Lena River).
- c. Transportation of prisoners to Vaikarem, or Vaknarem, ~~[sic]~~ was followed by their distribution to a network of camps in the region of Nishai Kolymsk, on the East Siberian Sea. These camps were run by the MVD, under the command of an officer of unknown rank, named Sorochuk (probably an MVD major) and a civilian official named Chimbo.
- d. At the hi<sup>25X1</sup>t possible estimate, there were no more than 12,000 of these prisoners. By Apr 1952, three hundred were dead and 400 had been taken to barracks, gravely ill.

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Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800120028-5

SECRET  
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 March 1954

ER 5-5837

USAF review(s) completed.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: (Unclassified) U. S. Prisoners of War Remaining in Communist Custody After Termination of Exchange of Prisoners Under Terms of Korean Armistice Agreement

1. An unknown but apparently substantial number of U. S. military personnel captured in the course of the Korean War are still being held prisoners by the Communist Forces. These individuals will not necessarily be retained in North Korea or Manchuria, but may be held elsewhere within the Soviet orbit.

2. While it is possible that the release of some or all of these prisoners of war may eventually be effected through diplomatic negotiations, the fact that to this day apparently large numbers of German and Japanese prisoners of war from World War II are still in custody must be accepted as a Communist pattern. Today, for the first time, U. S. personnel in any quantity are coming into contact with this pattern. It is a fundamental obligation of the U. S. Government to vigorously pursue every authorized means to recover its fighting men being held hostage by anyone under any circumstances whatsoever.

3. The recovery of even a single individual in this category would have a salutary effect upon the morale of U. S. military personnel in contact with Communist Forces in the event of future hostilities, and would be of inestimable value in our National psychological program to expose for the world at large to see and understand the true nature of the Soviet-directed world Communist plot.

4. It is therefore requested that requirements be placed on appropriate operating organizations for clandestine and covert action to locate, identify, and recover those U. S. prisoners of war still in Communist custody. This action should take precedence over all other evasion and escape activities currently being planned or undertaken by the Agency in support of military requirements. It is further requested that any information collected pertaining to U. S. and other United Nations prisoners of war still in Communist custody be immediately forwarded to this Headquarters.

DOCUMENT NO.  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C 2011  
NEXT REVIEW DATE:  
AUTH: HR 10-2  
DATE: 17 MAR 1981  
REVIEWER: [ ]

*W F Twining*

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REQUIRED. F. TWINING

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

The office of record for this document is  
"Chief, Psychological Warfare Division,  
Directorate of Plans, DCS/Operations, Hq. USAF."  
Normal handling procedures are not applicable.  
Request replies or references be forwarded  
directly to or through the office of record.

Special handling of this paper is requested.  
Access should be limited to individuals requiring  
the information herein in order to carry out their  
official duties.

Approved For Release 2004/07/08 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800120028-5

Psy War 16-54

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EXHIBIT 2

MAR 24 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

THROUGH: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)

SUBJECT: U. S. Prisoners of War Remaining in Communist Custody.

- REFERENCES:
- a. Memo fm C/S, USAF, dtd 16 Mar '54, Subj. as above.
  - b. Memo fm Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, D/A, dtd 14 Aug '53, Subj. "Post Korean Armistice Planning for Covert, Clandestine, and Related Activities."

1. Reference a. contains a request from Chief of Staff, USAF that CIA undertake to locate, identify, and recover U.S. Prisoners of War still in Communist custody.

2. This request is in most respects identical with reference b., which was received last August from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, D/A.

3. The FI Staff has had a long standing requirement for information of this type, but so far has not obtained any worthwhile intelligence in this regard.

4. It is believed, as you are no doubt aware, that CIA has little or no operational capability to recover personnel from those areas in which POW's are being held in Manchuria, China, or the Soviet Union. In almost all such areas the priority of CIA effort is on the collection of early warning and order of battle information.

5. It is the opinion of this Staff that this Agency has no significant capabilities along the lines requested by the USAF.

6. It is therefore recommended that you sign the attached memorandum to Chief of Staff, USAF.

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DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 BY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE: 17 MAR 1981  
 REVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

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Approved For Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800120027-6

Attachment: 1 - as stated in par. 6 above

~~SECRET~~

9551a

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Chief of Staff  
United States Air Force

**SUBJECT:** United States Prisoners of War Remaining  
in Communist Custody After Termination of  
Exchange of Prisoners Under Korean  
Armistice Agreement Terms.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your memorandum dated 16 March 1954 on the above subject, asking Central Intelligence Agency to take action to locate, identify and recover U.S. POW's in Communist custody.

2. I agree with you fully that any accomplishment in this field would unquestionably have a salutary effect upon morale and would be of significant value in our national psychological program.

3. This Agency has had a continuing requirement for the development of information on the location of U.S. POW's. Any intelligence developed on this subject will be discussed promptly with Headquarters, United States Air Force. CIA then will consider in each case what steps, if any, can be taken to effect the release of the POW's involved. The inherent operational difficulties which would surround such an undertaking are clearly apparent, I am sure, to you.

4. The undertaking of any such action is predicated upon the availability of adequate operational intelligence. This agency does not have at the present time such adequate operational intelligence on which to base plans for liberating POW's under Communist control. Nor is it anticipated

*Reverie*

that CIA will have significant capabilities along these lines so long as operating conditions continue to follow the present pattern.

5. In compliance with your request, CIA will continue to endeavor to develop the required intelligence on POW's in Communist hands and will maintain appropriate contact with your headquarters on this subject.

*Recursion*

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

25X1

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[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

24 March 1954

Distribution:

- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 2 - DCI
- 1 - DD/P
- 1 - C/PM
- 1 - [Redacted]
- 1 - OPS/Chrono
- 1 - RI

*DD/P*

*Concur  
cpc  
DDCI  
7 9 May*

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1-625a

5-58371A

MAY 29 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff  
United States Air Force

SUBJECT: United States Prisoners of War remaining in  
Communist Custody after termination of Exchange  
of Prisoners under Korean Armistice Agreement  
Terms.

1. Reference is made to your memorandum of 16 March on the above subject, requesting that this Agency take action to locate, identify and recover U.S. POWs in Communist custody.

2. I agree with you fully that any accomplishment in this field would unquestionably have a salutary effect upon morale and would be of significant value in our national psychological program. At the same time I feel certain that you realize the inherent difficulties involved in operations of this type, particularly in the very territories where U.S. POWs are likely to be held.

3. This Agency has had a continuing requirement for the development of information on the location of U.S. POWs, and will continue to endeavor to obtain any possible intelligence in this regard. Any information produced on this subject will be promptly conveyed and discussed with Headquarters, United States Air Force. Should the Air Force receive any "leads" deemed worthy of exploration, it will be appreciated if you will make these available to us. CIA will then be in a position to determine what steps, if any, can be appropriately undertaken towards affecting the release of the POWs involved.

25X1

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.   
 DECLASSIFIED  
CLASS. AUTHORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
NEXT REVIEW DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: KE 1002  
DATE: 17 MAR 1981 REVIEWER: \_\_\_\_\_

02011

ER file

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4. You may be sure that CIA will do everything practicable to comply with your request and will maintain appropriate contact with your Headquarters concerning this subject.

SIGNED

ALLEN W. DULLES  
Director

*Resubmitted*

[Redacted]

25X126 May 1954

*(See Concurrences attached)*

*Dist:*

*Orig + 1 - Addressee*

*2 - DCI*

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*for COP who signed cover sheet*

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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1628

Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800120026-7

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 26 May 1954

25X1 FROM :

[Redacted]

SUBJECT: U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR REMAINING IN COMMUNIST CUSTODY

In compliance with your request, the letter to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force in regard to the recovery of Air Force personnel now held as prisoners has been rewritten.

The new letter to the Air Force is attached.

25X1

[Redacted]

DOCUMENT NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. LI  
 UNCLASSIFIED  
CLASS. & EXT. BY: [Redacted] 2011  
NEXT REVIEW DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
AUTH: [Redacted]  
DATE: 17 May 1954

Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000800120026-7

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25X1



MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Du JS

PM, which has the carbon of this letter,  
is preparing a reply for your signature which  
will be here tomorrow, Wednesday, 24 March.

[Redacted Signature Box]

RWF

23 March 1954  
(DATE)

STAT

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EO - Mr. Staats

DATE: 31 January 1955

FROM : SPS - Dr. Craig



*Handwritten signature*

SUBJECT: Interview with Rastvorov (former MVD) concerning U.S. Prisoners of War in the USSR

On Friday, 28 January 1955, a meeting was arranged between members of the Special Projects Staff and Mr. Rastvorov. General Dale O. Smith was also present. The interview was on the subject of U.S. prisoners of war being held by the Soviets.

Mr. Rastvorov made the following important points bearing upon the subject:

1. He was told by recent arrivals (1950-1953) from the Soviet Union to the USSR's Tokyo mission that U.S. and other UN POW's were being held in Siberia.
2. The POW's will be screened by the Soviets and trained to be illegal residents in U.S. or other countries where they can live as Americans.
3. Selected POW's will be used in propaganda work.
4. Use will be made of the identities and biographies of dead POW's in preparing legends for new Soviet agents.
5. The mechanism for POW control in Korea was headed by the Soviets.
6. The sentencing of the eleven U.S. POW's charged with espionage by the Chinese Communists was conceived and directed by the Soviets. The release of other Americans in Europe was part of this plot.

*Handwritten vertical note: Dec 29, 1961 (1/21/55)*

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.0(b)
MA 92-3550
BY <i>EB</i> DATE 1/9/96

*Handwritten initials/signature*

OCB:SPSFJCorso:mas

~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT 3

C06002491

02 JUN 1993

CLASSIFIED VERSION OF UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS  
HAND DELIVERED TO HILL ON 26 MAY 93 BY [REDACTED]  
SENATE LIAISON OFFICER.

DELIVERED TO: HPSCI, SSCI, SEN SMITH, AND  
TO WOODWARD, SEN KERRY'S OFFICE.

(b)(3)(c)

EXHIBIT 4

C06002491

*DR/SA*

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

*J POW*

(b)(3)(n)  
(b)(1)

The [redacted] Reports

Seven intelligence reports on treatment of US prisoners in Hanoi--disseminated during 1970--found by CIA in routine review for the Senate Select Committee on POW-MIA Affairs. Not released until February 1993 (after Select Committee went out of business), due to massive volume of information reviewed.

(b)(3)(c)

[redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)(n)

*Political sensitivity:* The reports tend to corroborate both the numbers and some other facts contained in the recently-released Russian document (purporting to be a report to the Vietnamese Politburo, it claimed Hanoi held 1205 POWs in 1972).

[redacted]

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)(n)

On [redacted] A "rallier" (*chieu hoi*) in 1969, formerly a North Vietnamese army doctor. Claimed a lot of knowledge on the POW system, but his reporting was portrayed at the time as second or third hand. [redacted] was "surfaced" in Saigon in 1971 for the press, probably because his information on Russian, Chinese and Czech involvement in interrogating POWs (subsequently proven inaccurate) was useful. CIA decided his numbers of POWs were not verifiable and could only mislead families, and deleted that section from his press conference.

(b)(1)  
(b)(3)(n)

[redacted]

**Additional Questions of Concern**

Assessment of his reporting -- Not formally done yet. Initial reviews indicate a lot of errors in his information on how POWs were handled. Enough to make all his reporting, including numbers, suspect. Because CIA knew so little about the system at the time, his reports were disseminated. Subsequent debriefs of actual POWs prove his information erroneous.

[redacted] No longer in possession of current information, was evidently not very useful in consultant position (no disseminable info). Seems to have wanted to pursue other employment options, as a medical doctor, perhaps in US.

Where is he now? -- We don't know. INS has no record of him as an immigrant, refugee, or applicant for asylum.

[redacted]

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

*Cys to (M) L  
Jaw (B) Sept.  
Ca*

*B 9/5*

28 August 1985

Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Department of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301

*O. 11-08-85  
P. 9/14/85  
R. 11/4/85  
S. 11/9/85*

Dear Jim:

In your letter of 12 August 1985, you enquired about the Agency's capability to [redacted] should other credible intelligence sources indicate the possible presence of U.S. POWs. We have queried [redacted] to determine their views and have been advised that operations [redacted] are certainly feasible although they would require the witting cooperation of [redacted]. Similarly, a mission to the Central Highlands of the SRV would be possible [redacted]

*aw 12/9*

It should be borne in mind, however, that in the event the team was discovered, the problems of exfiltration [redacted] would be immense. Overland missions [redacted] would be even more difficult and would almost certainly come to the attention of the Vietnamese authorities. Infiltration of a team [redacted] does not seem practical at this time although it could be attempted if [redacted] the probable high risk of failure were factored in and accepted.

Should a mission [redacted] be considered justified, we would estimate that a minimum of four to six weeks would be necessary for the selection and training of personnel. Depending upon the wishes of [redacted] team members [redacted]

It is difficult to estimate lead time required for an infiltration into Vietnam because much would depend on the precise location of the target.



~~SECRET~~

EXHIBIT 5


NO 982022 ----- 1911

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As indicated above, existing equities would require that any mission [redacted] be mounted only with the full approval and cooperation of [redacted]. If the Ops Plan appeared feasible, we believe [redacted] would cooperate.

I hope this is helpful and if there is any additional information you require, we would be pleased to assist.

Sincerely,



William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence

~~SECRET~~

1000070  
NO 982022 ----- 1912

29 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Prisoners of War

I'd like a rundown of the present state of our knowledge, leads, and activities with respect to POWs.



William J. Casey

Attachment:  
WALL STREET JOURNAL article,  
dtd 24 April 1985, "POWs Won't  
Be Found Without Cost"

25X1

**EXHIBIT 6**

SECRET