American POW/MIAs in North Korean Hands & Questions Pyongyang Must Answer

June 30, 2008

This White Paper demonstrates Pyongyang’s extensive knowledge of the fates of U.S. POW/MIAs, along with the possibility that American prisoners may still be alive in North Korea. It is intended as an overview and not a definitive source. During the war, North Korean, Chinese and Soviet officials all handled U.S. prisoners-of-war and information concerning them. This White Paper is focused on North Korea and the Americans captured and processed on its territory; it touches only briefly upon the reported shipments of U.S. prisoners from North Korea to China and the Soviet Union. However, evidence suggests North Korea can shed considerable light on those shipments.

This document is based on declassified U.S. government intelligence reports; other government records; testimonies; interviews; and research trips to North Korea and Russia. Source documentation and supporting information, including video of four persons claiming live sightings of suspected American prisoners in North Korea years after the war, are available to qualified requestors. This White Paper has been prepared on behalf of the National Alliance of Families for the Return of America’s Missing Servicemen (NAF).

NAF believes North Korea must be required to answer the following questions, among others:

1) Who are the imprisoned “U.S. POWs” reported by North Korean escapees and other sources years after the war and who are the living “war criminals” or “survivors from the war” referenced by North Korean officials in recent years?
2) What happened to the Americans who were known to be alive and in North Korean prisoner camps but never returned?
3) What does North Korea know about reported shipments of U.S. POWs from Korea to China and the Soviet Union? [including Sgt. Richard Desautels – in June 2008 the Pentagon admitted that Beijing, following 50 years of North Korean and Chinese denials, had in 2003 admitted removing him from Korea. As of today, China claims Desautels died in Shenyang in 1953 but his remains cannot be found and additional information about him is “classified.” There is no public indication the U.S. government has asked North Korea for information on Sgt. Desautels following these revelations. Please see more below.] 2
4) What does North Korea know about the men whose identification cards, and other information about them, have been displayed in Pyongyang’s Korean War Museum?
5) Did North Korea receive U.S. prisoners, or information about U.S. prisoners, from Vietnam during or after the Vietnam War?
6) According to a Pentagon report, North Korea has stored the remains of 100 American servicemen – many, many more are known to be buried in North Korea. When will North Korea provide the U.S. with the remains it is holding and allow full recovery operations to return the rest?

Lt. Gilbert Ashley and 4 Crewmen Were "Known to Be Alive in Communist Hands As of the Close of the Korean Conflict," According to U.S. Intelligence in 1955

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Numbers

The updated numbers below are from a briefing by the Pentagon’s Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) to NAF on June 20, 2008.

Total POW/MIA: 8,056 U.S. servicemen plus seven U.S. civilians
Of the Total, Seen Killed on the Battlefield and Body Not Recovered: 1,783
Of the Total, Died as POWs or Prisoners Last Seen Mortally Ill: 2,036
Of the Total, Non-Battle Deaths and Body Not Recovered: 98
Of the Total, “MIAs” -- Men Not Reported Dead But Never Returned: 4,139 [NAF comment: This includes many men seen being captured or reported in communist captivity; men who were undoubtedly killed on the battlefield and whose remains are in North Korea; others killed whose remains were destroyed or not recoverable; and those who simply “disappeared.”]

History

The Korean War (June 25, 1950 to July 27, 1953) was fought between the United Nations, represented predominantly by the United States and Republic of Korea (South Korea), and the communist side, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) and People’s Republic of China (communist China), with substantial logistical and air combat support from the Soviet Union.

During the war, POW camps were initially run by the North Koreans and then taken over in large part by the Chinese; the Soviets also remained involved with the POWs throughout the conflict. American officials tracked those captured by the communists via radio broadcasts made from POW camps, letters and petitions, intelligence reports and eyewitness accounts from fellow troops who saw their colleagues captured. Numerous U.S. intelligence reports also indicated U.S. POWs were being moved from North Korea into camps in China and that some were also being shipped to the Soviet Union. In 1952, Soviet leader Josef Stalin and Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai discussed retaining 20 percent of the U.N. prisoners.3 Intelligence reports during and after the war reported that hundreds of Americans had been held in Chinese and Soviet camps from which no POW ever returned. (In June 2008, DPMO stated: “We have also been unable to verify definitively the reports we have received regarding possible transfers or the ultimate fate of any possible candidates for transfer to other countries such as the former Soviet Union.”)

The final period of the Korean War was fought largely over the POW issue. Many prisoners captured by the U.S. had been forced to fight for the communists and did not want to be sent back. The communist side wanted them and demanded an “all-for-all” exchange. The U.N. insisted that prisoners have the right to decide where they wanted to go, a position that ultimately triumphed. However, when the war ended in an armistice (there is no peace treaty to this day) and the prisoners were exchanged, both sides claimed the other had withheld POWs. Many U.S. officials -- from senior commanders to intelligence analysts -- believed U.S. prisoners had been held back for their technical skills, espionage purposes or use as political bargaining chips. “We learned the Chinese and North Koreans…had refused to return all the prisoners they captured. Why the Reds refused to return all our captured personnel we could only guess. I think one reason was that they wanted to hold the prisoners as hostages for future bargaining with us,” said General Mark Clark, commander of U.N. forces. Especially frustrating were the cases of Americans known by name to have been held by the communists but never returned. In September 1953, the U.N. demanded an accounting for 3,404 troops, including 944 Americans (a list later reduced by subsequent intelligence and graves registration work to 389) believed to have been in communist hands but never returned. According to the U.N., these men: “(1) Spoke or were referred to in broadcasts by your radio stations. (2) Were listed by you as being captives. (3) Wrote letters from your camps. (4) Were seen in your prisons.” Despite pressure from the U.N., the communists refused to provide any information on most of these men. The scant data provided was in most cases clearly bogus – in 1956, the communists stated Sgt. Desautels (see below) had “escaped.” They made the same claim about Capt. Harry Moreland, a double amputee when he was last seen in communist captivity.

By 1955, the U.S. government, at least in private, had concluded that existing policy options would prove unable to force a full accounting. The Chinese had revealed they had been holding secretly a small group of Korean War aviators as “war criminals.” They, and two CIA officers captured in China, were eventually released. But as for a full accounting, a (then) classified Pentagon memo concluded: “The problem becomes almost a philosophical one. If we are ‘at war,’ cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this sort of thing. If we are in for fifty years of peripheral ‘fire fights’ we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this (the POWs) for the political reasons.”
Intelligence efforts wound down during the mid-and-late 1950s and much of the information on missing Americans was sent to the vaults, where it remained classified into the 1990s and beyond.

However, for the public at least, Korean War POW/MIAs remained a major issue. In 1957, a “Sense of the Congress” resolution stated that an accounting and/or return of U.S. POW/MIAs from Korea should be “a primary objective of the foreign policy of the United States.” From time-to-time, the issue received renewed attention: in the early 1990s, (then) Senator Bob Smith pushed for answers and was told by the North Korean Vice Foreign Minister: “The Chinese manned the American POW camps in Korea and the Chinese guards took them across the border into China during and at the end of the war;” in 1993, Pentagon investigators concluded U.S. prisoners were shipped from North Korea to the Soviet Union; in 1996, a Pentagon analyst reported “there are too many live sighting reports…to dismiss that there are no American POWs in North Korea” (see the “DPMO Analyst I.O.Lee report” at www.nationalalliance.org); and in 1997 the Associated Press reported a North Korean official had acknowledged “survivors of the war” in his country but the Clinton Administration declined to follow up. The escape of ROK (South Korean) POWs, America’s brothers-in-arms during the Korean War, from the North in recent years has also raised the issue. As with the Americans, U.S. intelligence officials believed many ROK troops had been held back, yet they were ultimately declared dead. But as security levels in North Korea have deteriorated in recent years, these men have started to escape and return to their homeland very much alive and South Korea now estimates as many as 500 may still be imprisoned in North Korea.

Despite all this, in recent years the Pentagon and State Department have downplayed the Korean POW/MIA issue, especially regarding Americans captured alive but never returned. Instead they have focused the issue on U.S. remains in North Korea, launching limited trips from 1996-2005 to recover remains -- trips for which the North Koreans have reportedly demanded substantial payment. Reports of Americans still alive in North Korea have been classified, "analyzed" for years, and eventually dismissed because they “could not be corroborated” or the witness’ story was inconsistent. NAF believes these dead-ends occur in many cases because there is no way for U.S. investigators to follow up effectively without North Korean cooperation. For example, North Korean escapees have told NAF they have the names of officials and prisoners who have POW information, but as far as NAF can tell, the U.S. government cannot or will not follow up in North Korea.

The Bush Administration also elected not to make POW/MIA accounting an issue in the “Six-Party Talks” which have led to the most recent concessions to North Korea. In contrast, Japan did focus its efforts on uncovering the truth about its citizens believed to have been abducted by North Korea for intelligence purposes. After years of stonewalling, starting in 2002 North Korea admitted it had indeed abducted Japanese citizens and eventually returned five of them. Japan continues to press for additional information. Tragically, this has created a situation in which the U.S. government has made accounting for Japanese civilians a higher priority than resolving the fates of American GIs. On June 26, President Bush announced he was dropping North Korea from “Trading with the Enemy” status and moving to remove Pyongyang from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. The President declared: “The other thing I want to assure our friends in Japan is that this process will not leave behind -- leave them behind on the abduction issue. The United States takes the abduction issue very seriously. We expect the North Koreans to solve this issue in a positive way for the Japanese…And it is important for the Japanese people to know that the United States will not abandon our strong ally and friend when it comes to helping resolve that issue.” The President made no mention of the U.S. POW/MIAs.

American Prisoners For Whom North Korea Should Account

There are literally scores of Americans who are believed to have been in enemy hands during the Korean War, were not known to have died in captivity and never returned – and this does not count the much larger number of men who simply “disappeared” in the North (and may have been candidates for the shipments to China and the Soviet Union discussed above). Here are just a few of the cases for which North Korea should be pressed for answers:

1) Crew of the B-29 in the “Green Dragon Rescue Operation”

This crew’s bomber was downed on Jan. 29, 1953. On May 24th, the U.S. military attempted a rescue operation in North Korea, during which radio contact was established with 1LT Gilbert Ashley. The rescuers had also obtained evidence that Ashley’s fellow crewmen Airman 2nd Class Hidemaro Ishida, 1LT Arthur R. Olsen, 2LT John P. Shaddick and 1LT Harold P. Turner were alive in enemy hands. The rescue turned out to be an ambush and the crewmen could not be recovered. “Ashley and four crew members, (Turner, Olsen, Shaddick, and Ishida) were known to be alive in Communist hands as of the close of the Korean conflict, Jul 53,” reported a previously classified U.S. Air Intelligence Report from Oct. 19, 1955. (It is unclear what information the U.S. possessed
indicating their survival in enemy hands from the attempted rescue in May to the end of the war in July.)

2) Other Americans Reported Held But Never Returned (selected cases from declassified U.S. military records; does not include cases where pilots were last seen alive on the ground; quoted sections below are from declassified U.S. documents)

ALLEN, Jack V.: On the “Neilsen-Henderson” (sometimes spelled: Nielsen-Hendersen) list maintained by U.S. intelligence of U.S. Air Force personnel reported to be in Kaesong (North Korea) awaiting repatriation but not returned at the end of the war; multiple other names on this list.

ANDERSON, Robert E.: “Information received from USAF repatriate indicates that Lt. Anderson is a PW.”

BRENNAN, John C. “He was listed as awaiting repatriation in Kaesong (Sep 53), on the Neilsen-Henderson list.” The repatriated pilot of his aircraft believed some of his crewmen, who did not return, had been captured due to E&E equipment he saw and questions he was asked by communist interrogators.

GLASSER, Gerald W: “Sixty-six returnees reported the subject was a prisoner. The statements indicated that he was in Prison Camp No. 1…In the Spring of 1953 he was taken away in a jeep by Chinese officers,” according to declassified U.S. military records.

HAWKINS, Luther R.: Reported held in POW Camp #2. On the Neilsen-Henderson list.

KEENE, Kassel M.: “The Source stated subject was sentenced to 21 1/2 years for assaulting a fellow prisoner. He was sentenced in July 53. According to the sentence he was not to be effected by repatriation.” (note sentence for this offense is 2 ½ years in Patton case below; “21 ½” in this file may be a typo in the intelligence report)

LOGAN, Sam: Pilot of a B-29, he was held in Pyongyang in 1950. A Soviet news agency published a picture of him and stated he was a prisoner.

MARTIN, Robert L.: “He was last seen in Apr 53 at Pyoktong Camp #2 Hq. His condition was fair.” “He was sentenced to one year for hitting an interrogator.” “Listed as not likely to return.” (from U.S. intelligence reports)

MOORE, John G.: “The subject was witnessed alive as POW by repatriated personnel.”

MORELAND, Harry D.: Captured in 1952 and seen by other U.S. prisoners. By November 1952, both his legs had been amputated. The North Koreans and Chinese later claimed he had “escaped.”

PATTON, George W.: “The pilot was sentenced to two and one-half years for assaulting a fellow prisoner. The sentence was in Jul 53. This sentence was not to be affected by repatriation.”

SPATH, Charles R.: U.S. Intelligence reported this fighter pilot had been captured. He is believed to have been the focus of a rescue attempt similar to “Green Dragon” in which he was confirmed alive on the ground and under enemy control in May 1952.

WALKER, Archie: Captured in August 1950. In 1951, the communists broadcast messages to the mothers of U.S. POWs being held; PVT Walker’s mother, Vergie Walker, received a message. The communists later said they had “no data” on Walker.
The War Museum

In late 1996, the author of this report visited the “Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum” in Pyongyang, North Korea. At the museum, the North Koreans displayed the identification cards of the following MIAs for whom they have never accounted.

1) Air Force 2Lt. Richard Rosenvall
2) Air Force 2Lt. Gerard Cyr
3) Army PFC Elmer V. Wing
4) Air Force 2Lt Dewey Stopa (on the “Green Dragon” crew -- see above; apparently captured separately from those involved in the rescue attempt and reported to have died in a North Korean prison)

Pentagon researchers subsequently visited the museum and collected other information on unrepatriated U.S. POW/MIAs, adding to information obtained earlier by the State Department. There is no public record that the North Koreans have provided information on the fate of these and other Americans whose information is publicly displayed in the museum.

Selected Cases Where Family Members Demand an Accounting

Sgt. Lewis W. Sowles: Wounded during fierce fighting between the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division and Chinese forces on Nov. 30, 1950. He went missing near Kunu-ri, North Korea. Many other Americans, included Sgt. Desautels, disappeared from this area.

Sgt. Sowles’ son Bill has been struggling to learn the fate of his father for decades.

Sgt. Philip Mandra: Awarded Silver Star for bravery in battle in July 1952. Disappeared on Bronco Hill with four other Marines on August 7, 1952. The men were wounded due to concussion grenades thrown by Chinese forces. When U.S. forces retook the position minutes later, the men were gone. A Russian colonel later reported seeing Sgt. Mandra in the Soviet Union.

Irene Mandra, Sgt. Mandra’s sister, has never given up the effort to determine his fate.
The Desautels Case

For more than a decade, NAF pressed the U.S. government to demand an accounting for Sgt. Richard G. Desautels, captured December 1, 1950 and reported in communist captivity by 19 fellow American prisoners who returned at the end of the war. According to these reports, Desautels had been taken into Manchuria (China) after his capture, contrary to claims by North Korea and China that no American prisoners were taken from North Korea. While in Manchuria, he worked on trucks and learned the Chinese language. Months later he was placed back in a POW camp in North Korea, where he angered the Chinese guards by interpreting for the other Americans.

In 1953, shortly before the end of the war, Desautels told his fellow GIs that he was going to be taken back to Manchuria. "When we were repatriated, I saw him. He was taken away ‘cause he could speak Chinese, so they took him out of the camp. They said he was a rumor spreader and blamed everything that went on in camp on him,” said one of his fellow Americans. Another returned American said: “The above mentioned POW was taken into China... He returned to Camp No. 5 in March 1952, at that time he mentioned if he should disappear to make inquiries concerning his whereabouts with the proper military authorities.”

In 1956, pressed on the cases of Sgt. Desautels and many other missing Americans, the North Korean/Chinese negotiators claimed Desautels had “escaped.”

But in June 2008, NAF learned that five years earlier, in 2003, China had admitted to the Pentagon that Desautels had indeed been taken from North Korea. Beijing claimed had died in April 1953 after becoming “mentally ill,” and was buried in Shenyang. The Chinese also claimed they no longer knew the location of Desautels remains and that it possessed a 9-10 page report on the lost American, but it was classified.

As far as NAF can tell, the Pentagon never obtained the classified Chinese report, never followed up with analysis of the plausibility of the Chinese story, and never made public that the communists had in 2003 quietly dropped more than 50 years of North Korean and Chinese denials that U.S. prisoners were shipped out of North Korea (one of the few other official cracks in this communist stonewall, this by the North Koreans, was the comment, discussed earlier, by North Korean officials to Sen. Smith in the 1990s). There is no indication the U.S. government followed up on the fact that Shenyang was at the time of the war known as Mukden, the site of multiple U.S. intelligence reports concerning secret prison camps from which Americans would not return and a stop on the reported transfer line of U.S. prisoners to the Soviet Union. Finally, there is no indication the U.S. government pressed North Korea for details on this case and other information it might have on Americans shipped from North Korea to other nations.

(more follows)
Vietnam

During the Vietnam War, ROK troops fought on the U.S. side. Open-source information and U.S. intelligence reports declassified in recent years indicate North Korean troops fought on the communist side in anti-aircraft and fighter pilot roles in direct combat against American forces. There are reports that some ROK troops captured by the communists in Vietnam were sent to North Korea. The CIA report at left at least raises at least the possibility that a similar fate may have occurred to some U.S. prisoners in Vietnam. In June 2008, DPMO officials stated they were unaware of this report. While it is impossible to judge the reliability of this report and the potential transfer of U.S. prisoners from North Vietnam to North Korea, North Korea’s advisors in Vietnam might well have collected information on the fate of U.S. servicemen missing from the Vietnam conflict and NAF believes they should be requested to share this information with the U.S. (as have former Soviet Bloc nations that had advisors in North Vietnam).

Live Sightings

Much U.S. government intelligence on the potential presence of U.S. POWs in North Korea apparently remains classified. In addition, NAF believes the POW issue has been far from a top collection priority for the U.S. Intelligence Community. However, “live sightings” of U.S. prisoners in North Korea years after the war continue to be reported. NAF is aware of reports until at least 2000 and a list of classified sightings held by the Pentagon as of 2006 (see chart below) indicates more recent reports may exist.

Here are brief summaries of selected reports NAF has followed:

Oh Young Nam: This former North Korean secret police official says he repeatedly saw 20-30 elderly Caucasians and blacks in a highly-secure area north of Pyongyang from 1982 to 1993. Mr. Oh says his comrades told him the men were American POWs.

“I asked: ‘Who are those people?’ I was told that they were American POWs. I was surprised that there were still American POWs alive. They all seemed to have families and their wives were North Korean,” Mr. Oh stated.

In June 2008, DPMO claimed this was “second-hand information” (because the Caucasians and blacks did not personally tell him they were POWs) and says this sighting “could not be corroborated.” Mr. Oh continues to assert that he saw American POWs and provided a video statement, with the help of the North Korea Freedom Coalition (NKFC), to NAF in June 2008.

Kim Yong: A former North Korean security official imprisoned after Pyongyang claimed his father had assisted the CIA (Mr. Kim states his father and other family members were publicly executed). Mr. Kim says he saw several Caucasians in one of North Korea’s most notorious prisoner camps in 1996. According to a fellow inmate who knew them, the prisoners were U.S. and British prisoners-of-war; the inmate noted the specific location of their capture. Mr. Kim understood they were imprisoned because they refused to accept communism. DPMO in June 2008 stated that Mr. Kim’s story has changed over time enough “to question the
The veracity of his claim.” Mr. Kim now lives in the United States and recounted his sighting in detail at a meeting with NAF in June 2008.

Choi Jung Hyun: Mr. Choi, in a June 2008 interview arranged by the NKFC, stated that while a soldier in April of 2000, he visited Aplok River College and saw a Caucasian man wearing a North Korean uniform. “My first thought was that he may be Russian, as many Russian army personnel came through army bases. But, I was told that he was a US POW and that he was to be an English professor at the Aplok River College and that he was currently working as a specialist in US TV media research,” Mr. Choi stated. Mr. Choi was shown a picture of James Dresnok, an American Army defector known to be alive in North Korea who has taught English in the past. Mr. Choi stated the man he saw was not Dresnok. To our knowledge, Mr. Choi has not been interviewed about this sighting by the U.S. government.

Kim Yong Hwa: Mr. Kim, according to a 1996 published report, said he had spent 40 days with an American POW called “John Smith” at a North Korean airfield in 1971. Smith spent time doing translations and menial labor, Mr. Kim said, and he talked about wanting to marry although he had given up hope of ever returning to the United States. Regarding this report, DPMO in June 2008 stated that because the two John Smith’s unaccounted for in the Korean War are believed to have died in 1950, “we are unsure who Mr. Kim is referring to.” It appears DPMO may not have debriefed Mr. Kim.

Serban Oprica: Mr. Oprica, then a Romanian engineer and now a U.S. citizen, said he saw field workers who appeared Caucasian during a 1979 bus trip in North Korea. He reported that others in his group claimed they were American POWs. After a delay of many years, DPMO tracked down two others who were on the bus with Mr. Oprica. “They all agreed that some of those sighted appeared to be Caucasian,” DPMO reported in June 2008. However, because the men did not appear to be under armed guard, DPMO suggests they may have been Eastern Europeans providing “symbolic field labor.” In June 2008, Mr. Oprica vigorously rejected this explanation.

“Classified Generic Case Files”/Korea
(DPMO list as of May 2008; last updated October 2006; existence/status of later cases unknown)

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About the Author

Mark Sauter has been investigating the fate of Korean War POW/MIAs since 1989. His research has included extensive work forcing the declassification of decades-old U.S. intelligence documents held by the National Archives and government agencies; he has also conducted research in North Korea and Russia. Mr. Sauter served in the Korean DMZ during the 1980s while an Army officer and is a graduate of Harvard University and the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. He serves as a volunteer researcher for the National Alliance of Families and is by profession an investment banker.

1 Five U.S. soldiers defected to North Korea after the war. We have eliminated reports concerning their presence in North Korea.
2 Neither China nor North Korea has provided information on numerous other reports of shipments from North Korea to China and the Soviet Union. For information on Sgt. Desautels, see: http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25277607/. Earlier this year, China agreed to open some of its POW archives, but to our knowledge no documents have yet been released. Following numerous reports of American prisoners shipped to the Soviet Union during Korea, the Cold War and other conflicts (see more below; additional information available upon request), Russia and the U.S. established the United States-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs, but it was quietly shut down by Moscow in 2004. http://www.dtic.mil/dpms/sovietunion/jcsd.htm
3 Shipments to China: numerous declassified documents obtained by NAF and available for review. Shipment to Russia and the Stalin/Chou En-lai meeting: “The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union.” 1993 Pentagon Study http://www.nationalalliance.org/korea/korea01.htm. After 1993, Pentagon investigators obtained substantial additional evidence on the shipment of U.S. POWs to Russia. Many of these reports are available from the Library of Congress and the Pentagon also updates a study, including several reports of prisoners from Korea, concerning Americans held in the Soviet Union but never returned: http://www.dtic.mil/dpms/sovietunion/gulag_study.htm
4 “Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War,” June 17, 1955, Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense
6 Associated Press, Sep. 30, 1997